THE New Republic

Khrushchev's Agenda

An Editorial

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PARADOXES OF UNION DEMOCRACY

Concluding Article on Labor Since the Merger

SEPTEMBER 21, 1959

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Washington Wire

Roll Out the Carpet

A MOUSE-SHY ELEPHANT embarrasses its friends. Some of the school-girl self-consciousness exhibited by the US before the mouse—roly-poly Mr. K.—arrived made its admirers blush. Protocol was preserved: 125 feet of red carpet rolled out, 10 bands banged away, arrangements were made to park the huge Soviet turbojet airliner on the main runway because it was too big for usual connecting taxi-strips, and the little Russian bounced out, moon-shot behind him. He is pudgy and bubbling, flexible as rubber, hard as steel, a master politician, threatening and cajoling by turns. But—so what? He is only Khrushchev. Before he arrived you would have thought the hysterical elephant would climb a date palm.

Let us say at once we think the idea of the visit a good one and we doubt whether anybody but Eisenhower could have pulled it off. In the same way nobody but Eisenhower could have freed the captive State Department from Republican imprisonment in 1953. It had to be a Republican. Had a Democrat invited Khrushchev every Republican would have purpled with suspicion and Nixon—well, we hate to think of Nixon.

One of the advantages of having a male Queen Elizabeth reigning in Washington is that critical faculties are benumbed in any case, and that even the red-blooded super-patriots are tranquillized by the thought that things are probably safe and static whatever Eisenhower does.

The President had a personal triumph in London, Paris and Bonn. As a great war leader he deserved it. It was gratifying to everybody. Goodwill does not launch ships, but it greases the ways. But did he actually settle anything? Nobody knows. There is some danger that he raised the hopes of the simple-hearted for another let-down like that after the 1955 "new spirit" Geneva Summit. This is not carping. Let it be said, and said frankly, that if Eisenhower actually does pull a settlement with Mr. K. out of the hat, or even a substantial easing of tension, he will go down in history as a great man and all the criticism levelled against him, including that of this column, will be justly forgotten.

The Promise and the Deed

CONGRESS quits Washington. Pretentious declarations of Lyndon Johnson last January seem ironic and pompous today against the Democratic accomplishment. Last January Johnson hailed "the starting of a new era" with his huge majorities, and he offered his own State-of-the-Union message. Awed columnists called him genius. Well, it didn't work out that way. But in fairness to Johnson this should be said: The Constitution assumes a balance in Washington between two affirmative opposing forces, two different leaderships. Eisenhower did not attempt a positive program or leadership; he simply dug in his heels on the no-spending line and used the two-thirds veto power to block affirmative action. Sputniks were "basketballs" and a full program might bankrupt the nation. This gave him an enormous, though negative, Constitutional advantage.

Johnson also had other difficulties. Lack of strong action on Civil Rights was part of a tacit bargain by Republicans to get support for their labor bill from conservative Southerners. Such coalitions undercut any leadership even when it does not try to be accommodating. Again Eisenhower's headlined "victories" over Congress in veto fights do not tell the whole story: the sullen Congress repeatedly voted against Eisenhower; what it lacked (save in the public works bill) was the Constitutional two-thirds. One less than two-thirds can still be a pretty big majority. The bitterness is bound to show up in next year's pre-election session.

Weary of having Eisenhower picture them as spenders and himself as saver, Congressmen finally revolted to cut foreign aid: a poor place to revolt, perhaps, but understandable enough. Particularly after Eisenhower self-righteously spurned Chairman Fulbright's disinterested effort to give Eisenhower greater long-term Development Loan funds (which the President had always before asked). Eisenhower had an affirmative policy on foreign aid—the one place where his negative veto weapon did him no good.

Up or Down?

THE STOCK MARKET had a bad sinking spell last week. Where it will end—up or down—we don't know. But stock prices have been pushed unnaturally high by the inflation scare. Millions have bought stocks, cagily assuming they were hedging against inflation which the White House trumpeted. It is doubtful if the Administration expected this result. For it the tremendous inflation bogey was a splendid excuse against social welfare spending, against higher wages and progress. Now the inflation-scared stock market seems at too high a pinnacle to maintain itself alone, particularly since, on the side, the government's tight money policy is braking that very business expansion which the surging stock market was supposed to discount.

The US steel industry is now mechanized to a point where it can produce all the steel the nation needs in 10 or 11 months. This means an idle month or so when the industry must pay wages for not producing. Management has seen the strike take care of that: the men are idle and management doesn't have to pay them. Now the backlog has been pretty well used up. Presumably Eisenhower will soon apply the Taft-Hartley law, requiring the men to go back to work for 80 days or so. It will be hard to get them out again right before Christmas. As for management—it should be able to maintain its record profit level.

The Gas "Mess"

A REVEALING ARTICLE in the current *Fortune* says the natural gas industry is in a "mess," expensive to consumers, because regulators won't regulate: four of the five Federal Trade Commissioners don't sympathize with the Natural Gas Act of 1938 and are side-stepping it. The four commissioners (named by the magazine) are all Eisenhower appointees.

T.R.B.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC
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Khrushchev's Agenda

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV is a most considerate guest. He not only took care of his own welcoming arrangements with the Soviet moon-shot, but also tactfully provided his host with an advance look at the agenda for their talks by allowing it to be published in an American magazine two weeks before his arrival. After repeating all the things both he and Stalin have said about co-existence over the years, Mr. Khrushchev makes it clear by his article in the October *Foreign Affairs* that the two questions on which he most wants to bargain are "discontinuing atomic and hydrogen tests" and increasing Soviet-American trade.

An extension of the nuclear test ban is perhaps Khrushchev's best hope for some concrete result from his trip. The points of disagreement between East and West after 10 months of discussion at Geneva are relatively minor. In fact, there has been a suspicion that Mr. Khrushchev was delaying proceedings until he could personally conclude matters with Mr. Eisenhower. It may be that accepting a minimum system of inspection of suspected test violations is a price Mr. Khrushchev is prepared to pay for the appearance of accomplishment on his visit to the US.

But the President is not presently in a position to make the most of such an opportunity if it occurs, for on the one remaining issue blocking a test ban agreement (the number of on-site inspections) "the United States at the moment has no negotiating position," as Hubert Humphrey recently pointed out in the Senate. "The government is still divided between those who are concerned about the risks involved in a continuing arms race and those who feel that we have more to gain than to lose by continuing tests and that we cannot afford to stop testing our nuclear weapons in the face of a control system that is less than perfect."

For lack of a determining, firm view on this issue, we could throw away the chance of getting at least one foot in the door that could open the way to Soviet acquiescence in a system of inspection—without which any nuclear disarmament is impossible. The President, of course, has an advantage our negotiators at Geneva have not shared: he has only to make up his own mind.

The question of increasing Soviet-American trade, about which Mr. Khrushchev wants to negotiate, could be a useful political weapon with respect to Berlin—a subject about which Mr. Khrushchev seems not to want to talk. To fulfill the back-breaking Soviet Seven-Year Plan, Mr. Khrushchev must have help in the form of trade. Technicians are telling the men in the Kremlin that they have gone as far as they can by hard work. Now they must mechanize, automate, and that requires highly complex machinery made in the US. Probably the primary goal of Khrushchev's visit, therefore, is to break existing barriers to such trade: the reluctance of American businessmen to deal with so undependable and unimportant a world trader (the second largest economy in the world now exports to the free world at only the level of a country the size of Denmark); US

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export licensing restrictions; and the need for long-term credit to finance Soviet purchases.

To remove this third and most serious barrier Mr. Khrushchev might be willing to do a lot. During the British-Soviet trade pact negotiations last year Paul Einzig, London correspondent for the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle,* reported:

> It is even conceivable that one of the main reasons Khrushchev put forward his demands for the change in status of West Berlin is to strengthen his bargaining position, in order to be able to obtain large credits. This may sound fantastic. But we must bear in mind that Mr. Khrushchev's position in Russia depends on his ability to increase the volume of consumer goods without neglecting either capital investment or the maintenance of superior armed forces. To be able to do so he needs large external credits.

Einzig concluded: "It might be well worth his while to make substantial concessions in the political field for the sake of getting financial aid."

If the Administration decided to use trade as a lever for agreement on Berlin, what could it do?

Many of the smaller concessions the Russians seek would require Congressional approval, for example, restoring most-favored-nation treatment to Russia and lifting the embargo on major types of Soviet furs, including ermine, fox, mink and muskrat, which are now barred by the Trade Agreements Act of 1951 (more than one-third of all Soviet sales to the US last year consisted of other furs which were not barred). But two concessions Russia apparently wants most would not require Congressional action: administrative easing of strategic controls and long-term public/private credits via the Export-Import Bank.

On the question of strategic controls, many of the items denied shipment to Russia in the first half of 1959 could just as well be approved without damaging the national security. On the question of credits, the Administration could not as a practical matter permit this unless some compromise could be worked out under which the Russians agreed to buy a sizable share of US consumer goods.

Assuming the Administration were to give some on either or both of these Soviet requests, what could the Russians give us in return? Very little. And since they do not seem to be in a position to make economic-trade concessions of comparable magnitude, we might hold out for substantial political concessions—in Berlin and elsewhere. Fortunately from our view, trade arrangements are both slow and flexible: there would be time for Moscow to demonstrate good faith on Berlin before the trade flow began to rise and the means to speed it or shut it off as Russian performance justified.

Faculty Wanted

NEARLY 3.5 million students will register this month for some form of higher education—250,000 more than last year. To handle the increase, colleges are trying to expand their facilities to about 270,000 teachers—20,000 more than last June. With some 10,000 professors having retired or left the profession over the summer, a total of 30,000 recruits is needed. But since graduate schools last June granted only about 6,000 Ph.D.'s to people entering teaching, what the press calls a "shortage of qualified teachers" has developed.

For students in the classroom this "shortage" does not mean that there will be 24,000 classrooms without teachers. Somebody will be found to fill the vacancies. In most cases, this somebody will be a man who lacks his academic union card, and holds only a B.A. or M.A. In the universities, these apprentices will be graduate students more or less actively pursuing Ph.D.'s. Many will be capable teachers, closer to the undergraduates in both age and outlook than their more distinguished elders. But since not holding a Ph.D. keeps them in both psychological and economic peonage, these "instructors" (as they are called to distinguish them from "professors") rarely put their hearts into instruction. Instead, they worry about becoming professors, and rapidly discover that this is hastened more by doing research on their Ph.D. thesis than by devoting time and effort to undergraduates.

There is no reason to hope that universities will expand their graduate schools in the next decade to supply colleges with 30,000 Ph.D.'s a year for the next decade. In the first place, scholars profit by keeping themselves in short supply. In the second place, the academic profession has neither enough prestige nor high enough salaries to attract 30,000 capable graduate students annually. At best we may hope for a third this number, which leaves some 20,000 vacancies every year until 1970, and perhaps beyond, each of which will be filled by someone whom both colleges and other professors regard as unqualified.

The only alternative to such a future is to discover more efficient ways to employ what qualified teachers we have. Most colleges use a lecture pedagogy which was invented in the Middle Ages, when there were no books and students came to class to hear the professor read the manuscript. A first step at reforming the curriculum would be drastically to reduce the number of lectures a student attends every day. Instead of three or four hours a day in class, he might spend one or two. In the free time he would be sent to the library to read books—books which, if chosen with a modicum of skill, would prove far more exciting and instructive than the average college lecturer. Of course the students might not read these books very carefully, but as any examination reader can tell you, they don't listen to lectures very attentively

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either. And if they *did* learn to read books, what an advance over today's passive assimilation of pre-digested ideas!

If students spent only 8 or 10 hours a week in class, instead of 15 or 20, two students would be no more trouble than one is today. The six million college students of 1970 would be taught by the 250,000 teachers of 1959 without increasing the teaching load an iota. The only thing that would have to grow would be the library. What is more, doubling enrollment would mean doubling tuition income, and if the size of the faculty was constant, this would provide handsome salary increases. Thus by attracting better men to the academic profession, the colleges could assure that the few classes the student did attend would be more competently taught.

The choice is his: The colleges can send students to 8 or 10 lectures by competent scholars each week, and can supplement this by large doses of reading. Or else they can send the students to 15 or 20 lectures (some by teachers who lack both knowledge and self-respect) while letting the students continue to do little or no reading other than textbooks. The colleges can expand their faculties (and thus keep both salaries and academic standards low) or else they can retain their present teaching staff and raise both salaries and standards. The colleges can continue to spoon-feed their students with an antique pedagogy, or they can force them to take an active part in their own education.

Facts about Laos

"How is it," asks Sen. Mike Mansfield, "that after spending hundreds of millions on aid to Laos . . . the defense of the country can be so rapidly undermined by a battalion or two of Viet Minh forces?" The complete answer will not come from the UN fact-finding mission, and no answer will satisfy that leaves out of account the social structure of what, for a more accurate term, we call the *nation* of Laos.

Roughly half of the population consists of highland tribes (the Khas, Muongs, Meos, Lolos and Black Thais) who have long resisted the domination of the lowland Lao tribe (which had failed to establish an enduring national kingdom until French colonists imposed a Laotian administrative unity). Yet the officer corps of the present Royal Laotian Army is drawn almost entirely from aristocratic Lao families. A former ICA official, Haynes Miller, pointed out after a tour of duty in Laos that a "national" army which embodies in microcosm the very rivalries which have impeded the growth of the nation is not exactly dependable in a crisis. The tribesmen have a habit of picking up their weapons and heading for their villages, whether or not anyone else likes it. This explains in part at least why, according to an August 27 report by *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Frank Robertson, 40 percent of the local populace in the embattled hills of Sam Neua province, adjoining Viet-Nam, sympathize with the Communist-led rebellion—by the estimate of the provincial Royal Laotian military commander.

Shooting the Moon

In landing a rocket on the moon, Soviet scientists have done much more than provide a deafening fanfare for Nikita Khrushchev's arrival. Contrary to some disclaimers which have appeared in the press, the moon-shot demonstrates that the Russians have developed an electronic guidance system of impressive accuracy. They have proved that they can build precise rockets as well as big ones. And technically important is the fact that in doing so they have stuck to their concept of a single reliable big booster four times as large and perhaps five years ahead of the US capability.

It is true, however, that, as one expert remarked, "hitting the moon is far easier than hitting New York from Moscow," because the moon is bigger, relatively, than an ICBM target on earth. Reason: the moon has a gravitational field which exerts a pull on space objects as they enter it.

The danger is that realization of the Soviet achievements will panic our rocket and missile chiefs into even more frantic efforts to catch up with them in all fields simultaneously. Instead of experimenting with six different kinds of rockets at once, as we are doing now, the common sense approach would be to concentrate on perfecting two or three reliable vehicles through prolonged and careful testing without worrying about what payloads the Russians may be sending into space in the meantime. Trying to match each Soviet feat by rushing off in more directions will only produce more embarrassing headlines.

The Pursuit of Happiness

B.I.S.—Before the Inflation Scare—the big sales drive was "pricing-up," or persuading the public that it was smart to pay whatever the price tag said even if it were twice what the thing was worth, because to bargain or to shop around was Socially Unacceptable, or non-U.

The official anti-inflation campaign ended that. So now the merchandising kick is to persuade the customer that social status lies in owning two or more of everything—two homes, two or more TV's and hi-fi's, a telephone in every room, at least two stoves and two refrigerators; and so help us, a second furnace in the basement!

Business Week of September 5 describes this new sales drive, with an accompanying sketch that portrays the happy home of the Completely Acceptable American Family, or CAAF. In the garage the Sunday sedan and the station wagon stand side by side, with a Volkswagen

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snugly tucked into the gable ell above them. A "mobile home," with a TV antenna, peers around the other side of the house.

In the kitchen are two stoves and two refrigerators, while down in the rumpus room daughter has just cooked a snack for her boy-friend on a third stove, with a third refrigerator beside it. The happy couple have a swivel-mount TV and a phonograph for entertainment. Just beyond the partition are the two furnaces. (There are not two bookcases; there is not even one bookcase, or book, or magazine—not even *Business Week*.)

There is either a TV or a small radio in each room. Mom is telephoning in the kitchen, Dad is telephoning from an easy chair before the TV-hi-fi console. The youngest boy is telephoning from the tub in one of three bathrooms: in the second an older brother is holding a transistor radio in one hand and combing his hair with the other; and big brother is just answering a telephone from behind the shower curtain in the third.

Waiting for '60

AFTER PROTRACTED hearings and months of filibuster in committee, all Congress has managed to say in this session about civil rights is that the life of the Civil Rights Commission shall be extended. Fortunately, the Commission had earned an additional term; its final report and recommendations were comprehensive and hard-hitting, calling for federal registrars of voting where communities persist in defying law and for housing programs designed to provide more equal opportunities. And the significance of the recommendations was enhanced by the support of the Southern members of the Commission in many instances.

But the Commission and its investigations are not a substitute for the substantive measures required to meet the threat of closed schools, violence and Negroes' disfranchisement.

When Congress returns next January, Mr. Rayburn and Mr. Halleck in the House will be challenged to find a device for getting a civil rights bill out of Rep. Howard Smith's Rules Committee. In the Senate, Senators Johnson and Dirksen must likewise face up to the task of bypassing Senator Eastland's Judiciary Committee. Time will be of the essence. Scheduling the debate for January will give greater assurance of consideration of civil rights legislation on the merits, for with the passage of every week and the rising claims of other legislation, the disposition to concede to the threat of a Southern filibuster will increase.

The second session can help to dampen the fires lit by Southern extremists by a declaration of Congressional policy that calls for respect for the Supreme Court decision and the preservation of the public school system. It can provide financial and technical assistance to school systems that wish to desegregate, strengthen the right-to-vote laws, allow federal jurisdiction in cases of hate dynamitings and interference with school desegregation ordered by a court or voluntarily instituted. Congress in 1960 *can* do these things, but if the Dixiecrat-conservative Republican coalition operates as effectively as it has this year, there isn't much chance that it will.

Afterthoughts on Nixon and the Exhibition

Moscow

THE HOT BRIGHT summer has given way to cold rainy autumn here. But the seeds of Soviet-American understanding planted during the summer continue to flower.

Where controversy exists, the Russians are not much given to expressing unconventional opinions. They know better through 40-odd years of experience. They follow the official line. But once that controversy dies away, once the vitriolic headlines begin to gather dust, independent opinion makes its appearance.

So it has been with the two leading events of the summer season—Vice President Nixon's visit and the American National Exhibition he opened in July.

At the beginning both were ringed with bitterness. No adjective was spared, no tactic spurned, to prove the Exhibition untypical of American life. The famous Russian hospitality was sorely strained by Mr. Khrushchev's manners toward Mr. Nixon, and by the constant attacks on "captive nations week." Then suddenly Mr. Khrushchev received his prized invitation to the United States. Matters changed almost overnight. Attacks on the Exhibition slowed to a trickle. They were tempered with more constructive criticism and some praise. Now Vice President Nixon competes with Prime Minister Macmillan for pride of place in having paved the way for more illustrious visits—visits which are extravagantly billed here as a "turning point in modern history."

In its joy the official press has not bothered to refute the hard-hitting criticism Mr. Nixon made in his final television speech. The result has been less stricture on individual opinion. The man in the street leans less on the official crutch. He expresses more openly his own thoughts about Mr. Nixon and the American Exhibition.

Mr. Nixon's least spectacular words seem to have had the greatest impact on intelligent Russians. His straight-

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forward defense of American foreign policy and blunt criticism of Soviet policy have had little lasting effect. The Russians are as patriotic as the next people—probably more. With the information made available to them, they naturally support their government against ours. One or two speeches, even in Mr. Nixon's polished campaign style, has not changed that.

Yet the Russians *do* realize that they do not get *all* the information. Open irritation with this cultural isolation is expressed more and more openly. For instance, I have not met one person who would defend the jamming of foreign broadcasts or the ban on foreign newspapers. Precisely in this area Mr. Nixon made his greatest dent in the Soviet armor. The words of a young Russian in a cafe in Riga—the capital of Latvia—are typical. We sat watching couples whirl by to a succession of waltzes and indefinable "fast" fox trots. He was sipping a fashionable "cocktail" of cognac and milk, and altogether did not seem very happy in his Latvian surroundings.

"No doubt about it," he said, "Nixon hit a weak spot in our head when he said you Americans can hear 40 hours of our broadcasts a day. During the Cold War, there was some reason for jamming. Foreign broadcasts told many lies about us. But we are not children. We should be able to decide for ourselves what we want to hear."

A week later in Leningrad a fellow in the back of one of the numerous crowds clustered around visiting tourists before the hotel took an even more unorthodox line: "Yes, the exchange of visits between Khrushchev and Eisenhower is a good thing, but even better when we can go see for ourselves." The fact that 10,000 American tourists have visited the Soviet Union this summer has not been lost on the travel-hungry Russian.

Earlier in my travels a girl in a bikini bathing suit on the fashionable promenade at Sochi—the heart of the "Soviet Riviera" on the Caucasus side of the Black Sea—had taken up Mr. Nixon's remarks on free exchange of information. "Now we can listen to jazz on 'Voice of America', but once the words start the buzzing starts. It is not fair! And we know that many of the American authors who are best-sellers here are either dead or unheard of in the United States."

How far the American Exhibition went toward correcting this ignorance of American life is a much-debated question. The interest was tremendous. Attendance averaged 65,000 daily, or about two and three-quarter million for the six weeks. And the demand was much higher. Everywhere foreign tourists met vain requests for tickets. These were distributed by the Soviet authorities for one ruble but at times were going on the black market for 100 times the price.

Undoubtedly the Exhibition was the largest window on the West opened since 1917. Through it the Russians glimpsed comfort and ease which are still only a dream here. But did they believe what they saw? Many did not. After all they have never seen the United States, they have no standard of comparison, and the uniform merit of all the goods displayed presented them with none.

An objectively-minded student summed up this disbelief: "We know our own Exhibition in New York was propaganda, and we expect the same from you. Your Exhibition was run mainly by private business, and most people think it advertised the life of the capitalists, not the American people." But I think the genuine Russian disappointment goes deeper than that. They have an entirely different conception of exhibitions. They go to be *educated* (with a capital E) not entertained. Their own huge Agricultural and Industrial Exhibition on the outskirts of Moscow is the best example. Its buildings, parks and workingman's statues ramble on for miles. One pavilion after another is filled with charts, machinery, complicated technology of every type, samples of grain in every variety, and even farm animals. They are like large adult education classrooms.

NEWLY-INDUSTRIALIZED Russia is still in love with machines simply as machines. Here are tangible achievements the Soviets can exhibit with pride—both here and in New York. But they still have only a faint idea of the wealth these machines can produce. That is why the American Exhibition with its total emphasis on consumer goods came as such a shock. It was a shock born of the contrast between two levels of industrialization. In the words of one indignant Russian visitor: "We know the United States is a powerful country, but this exhibition has no feeling of power. Where is your machinery, your technology? This is the exhibition of an underdeveloped country!"

That does not mean the exhibition has been a failure, not at all. The controversy in itself has been healthy. By the end of the six weeks, Russians were arguing as much among themselves as with the American guides about the merits of the abstract art exhibit. Students particularly rebuffed charges of "rubbish" made by hostile elders. They scanned the impressionist and expressionist art books for hours in search of new ideas.

The over-all effect was cumulative. The latest finned giants of the automobile industry, the technicolor "circarama" journey across the United States, the breath-taking colored films fired in synchronized order across seven huge screens in the squat central dome—all produced an image of beauty and wealth no written word can dispel.

But the Exhibition had a subtle educational message of its own. Toward the end the Russians began to grasp it. The organizers could not have expressed it any better than the visitor who murmured in parting: "Ah, now I understand the difference between us. You Americans work to live. We still live to work."

GEORGE SHERMAN

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DETERRING MOSCOW

How Much, How Early?

by LOUIS J. HALLE

THE MAGNITUDE and frequency of international war in the past century has been the consequence of excessively rapid changes in power relationships. Thus the disintegration of Chinese power and the rise of Japanese power produced a series of wars in the Far East from 1895 to 1945. The disintegration of the Turkish empire left a vacuum of power in the strategic area of the eastern Mediterranean into which the surrounding powers of Europe were drawn. The consequent collisions produced a series of violent conflicts, from the Crimean War to World War I. The decline of British power has twice in this century drawn the United States into conflict with Germany on the continent of Europe and on the high seas. Now the decline of British, French and German power, together with the rise of Russian power, has drawn American power into conflict with Russian power on the same scene.

Under these circumstances, what would be the situation if we now allowed the power of the United States and its Atlantic allies to decline in proportion to the rising power of Russia? British strength had the latent strength of the United States behind it, in reserve, ready to replace it as it declined or when it failed. Expressing this in larger terms, one might say that the West, engaged in the repeated struggle to maintain the *status quo* against challengers, had American power in reserve. But this power, today, is already committed to action. The West, having to defend itself with all its forces, no longer has any national powers in reserve. If its power should decline now, as the Carthaginian power once declined in proportion to the growing power of Rome, it could look for no rescue. It would have to depend, then, largely on luck—some mishap to Soviet power, such as a falling out between Moscow and Peking, or a leadership crisis in Moscow. But Carthage had no such luck, and it would be unwise for the West to gamble on having it.

To avoid such a gamble, we may look, not to a potential rescuing country in reserve, but to the mobilization of the vast potentials of strength that constitute reserves of power within our own countries. For the threat that Russia will upset the balance of power against us is the threat that the power it mobilizes will at least come to exceed decisively the power that we mobilize on our side. The contest is not one of latent power, in which we could fully hold our own, but of mobilized power, in which we are clearly failing to hold our own. While our manpower and our economic apparatus are being devoted primarily to the maintenance of a high standard of living, the Russian manpower and economic apparatus are being devoted primarily to upsetting the balance of power. If ever we get sufficiently alarmed, as the British did in 1938, we may find it not impossible, given time, to restore the balance. The problem is that only a dire threat to our survival would justify us in making an effort that was, itself, bound to threaten our way of life by threatening the free operations on which our society is constitutionally based.

A difficult question of judgment is involved here. The Carthaginians, through a failure of judgment in like circumstances, made the effort to mobilize their total strength too late. The British almost made the effort too late in 1938, and we Americans almost made it too late twice in this century. The question that confronts us today, then, is: How much how early, if we are to avoid too little too late?

The two variables here—how much and how early—may be inversely proportionate to each other. The British needed to mobilize more strength to stop Hitler after 1938 than they would have needed to stop him in 1936. We Americans could have stopped and contained the Kaiser before 1914 with less effort than was needed by 1917. In making our judgment, then, we have to think in terms of *the earlier the less, the later the more.*

At this point another consideration, which today is vital, becomes apparent. The objective must be to prevent major war altogether, rather than simply to assure victory in such a war. The mobilization of enough strength early enough may deter the challenger from pressing his challenge by military aggression, and so avert war. If one waits too long, it may no longer be possible to avoid the test of battle. We know now that Hitler could have been stopped and defeated without war in 1936, when he invaded the Rhineland. But this was no longer possible three years later. In an age when the prevention

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of another unlimited war is imperative, the absolute deterrence of war acquires a new importance. It supports the argument for not waiting until the crisis has become acute to repair the balance of power.

In what way, specifically, has the balance of power been turning against the West in recent years?

For a number of years after the war the Soviet Union was overwhelmingly stronger in conventional ground forces, measured in terms of men, divisions or fire-power. But this strength was largely neutralized by our monopoly of atomic weapons and the means of their delivery. In the past decade, however, the Soviet Union has been acquiring an atomic capability to match our own. With the two rival atomic armaments now balancing each other off, each deterring the use of the other by its threat of retaliation, the Russian advantage in conventional forces comes to represent a net military superiority. The balance begins to swing over in favor of the Russians. This tempts them to indulge in a constantly bolder and more aggressive diplomacy, at the same time that it threatens to inhibit the resistance of the West. At one point after another the West is challenged, as at Berlin, and the West, feeling its relative weakness, is bound to find an attraction in possible diplomatic compromises that it would have rejected when it had been surer of its own strength. Then the allies of the United States, feeling that American protection is no longer dependable, may feel increasingly impelled to seek terms with Moscow.

Now, all this can be exaggerated. It is true that, in a world of power politics, the strength of a nation's diplomacy depends on the guns that stand back of its diplomats. A nation must hesitate to push claims that it lacks the power to enforce, or to resist claims that the other side does have the power to enforce. But the game that the diplomats play is a psychological game in which each side is guessing at the determination, as well as the strength, of the other. The question which each side has constantly to consider is the degree of threat before which the other side might be expected to back down. Over an issue like the Western presence in Berlin, for example, the Soviet Union has on occasion sought to give the impression, whether true or not, that in a last resort it would be willing to fight in support of an East German attempt to cut the West off from access to Berlin. The West seeks to give the impression that it would fight to maintain such access. The Soviet Union hopes that, by persuading the West of its determination to fight if necessary, it can get the West out of Berlin without fighting. The West hopes that, by persuading Moscow of its determination to resist eviction by force, it can get Moscow to abandon the attempt to evict it.

For us, then, everything depends on our ability to persuade the Soviet challenger of our determination to hold our own, even at the greatest risk and sacrifice. If he is so persuaded, he will feel impelled to acquiesce and to accept our continued possession of the positions in question. If he is not so persuaded, he will be tempted to try to push us out of those positions. Hitler would not have attempted the occupation of the Rhineland if he had not become convinced that France and Britain lacked the determination to oppose it.

To induce Moscow to desist from challenging our positions, then, to persuade it to accept a stabilization of international relations on a basis that all the parties to the conflict can live with, and to reduce the threat of a great war or great surrender, the West has to impress Moscow with its determination.

How does it do this?

It can attempt to do this by strong words. Its spokesmen can announce that they will never abandon this position or that. But what speaks louder than words is actions. Moscow is more likely, for example, to abandon its attempt to push us out of Berlin if we quietly prepare ground forces for possible limited operations on the approaches to Berlin than if we say we will resist eviction but manifestly refrain (as has been the case) from making any preparations to do so.

The prime purpose of military forces, for those who are defending the *status quo,* is not to balance the forces of a potential aggressor man for man and weapon for weapon. It is simply to make a demonstration of determination, accompanied by the minimum of strength, sufficient to deter him. The NATO forces are more valuable in the degree in which they demonstrate a determination to maintain the independence of West Europe than in any ability actually to win a war against the forces that Moscow could move against them.

THE best example of this principle is that of the Swiss. Switzerland, a nation of only five million, has never had military forces capable of resisting those of the relatively great powers by which it is surrounded and by which it has sometimes been threatened. Yet the Swiss have made and continue to make heavy sacrifices, sacrifices that bear directly on every Swiss family, for the maintenance of these forces. They are supported by a special direct tax for national defense, and every able-bodied adult male is required to perform periodic military service up to the age of 60. There is nothing hidden about the cost of the Swiss Army, which is essentially a national militia, comprising the entire male population, with a relatively small body of professional officers to run it. Yet the Army for which such a price is paid probably could not match any other national armament that might be sent against it.

The entire point that we have to grasp here is that the value of the Swiss Army as a deterrent to the conquest of Switzerland is less a function of its military effectiveness, though this is not negligible, than it is a function of what it costs the nation. For, by the sacri-

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fices which the Swiss show themselves willing to make for its maintenance, they demonstrate the fierceness of their determination to keep their independence. Any power that was considering their conquest would know that the resistance it encountered would represent this determination and be commensurate with it. And, even though it felt sure of being able to complete the conquest, nevertheless, and at an acceptable cost, it would have to face the prospect of then holding down a population obviously devoted to independence—a population, moreover, in which all the men had military training and were in possession of hidden weapons and ammunition. Hitler, as we now know, considered the conquest of Switzerland and decided against it.

If the position of the Finns today is happier than that of other East European peoples it is not because they have the military power to prevent the Soviet Union from overcoming them. In 1939, however, they gave Moscow a demonstration of their determination to remain free that has since deterred it from assuming the burden of holding them down. The Finns have achieved a degree of international stability, in their relations with the Soviet Union, on the basis of making it quite clear, by their actions rather than their words, that beyond a certain point they will not retreat.

Surely it is in these terms that we must judge the value of NATO. Its effectiveness does not depend on being able to match, man for man, some 175 or 200 divisions that Moscow and its satellites might be able to muster against it. Its primary effectiveness can only be as a demonstration of determination, represented by the sacrifices which the people of the Atlantic community show themselves ready to make for its maintenance. If the determination that it represents is sufficiently impressive, then Moscow will be deterred from challenging what it has been created to defend. It will be deterred by the knowledge that the challenge would set off a major war, with all that implies in the atomic age, and by the anticipation, in any case, of what it would cost to hold down peoples so determined to preserve their independence. A stabilization of the European situation, even an end to the Cold War, might then be achieved.

The purpose is deterrence. The question is how much, how early. The sacrifices that the West had to make in defending the Republic of Korea against military aggression were greater than those that would have been needed to deter the aggression. The sacrifices that the West might have to make in actually defending Berlin would surely be greater than the sacrifices needed to dissuade Moscow, today, from continuing to press its challenge.

The judgment of how much how early, then, is not to be made in terms of a balance of the physical elements of power only. It is to be made, primarily, in terms of the psychological elements that really count when it comes to deterrence. But, even in these terms, it is clear that we are hardly doing enough in time. Moscow's attitude becomes more challenging and more threatening as it sees its own power growing and, on the other hand, notes our own reluctance (like that of the Carthaginians before us) to accept those restrictions on the luxuries of life and those prospects of continued high taxation that would demonstrate an intelligent determination to hold our own.

The total mobilization of our resources for defense, to match the mobilization of resources in the Soviet bloc, would indeed destroy our free way of life. A degree of mobilization greater than the present, however, may be necessary to save our way of life.

THE STATE OF THE UNIONS—VIII

Paradoxes of Union Democracy

by WARNER BLOOMBERG, JR., JOEL SEIDMAN and VICTOR HOFFMANN

THE AFL-CIO BUILDING rises a relatively modest eight stories above Sixteenth Street in Washington—one block from the White House. Outside, it is plain, glass-stone modern. Inside, it is rather elegant with wide corridors, soft music, and gold-plated cuspidors. The lobby is dominated by a huge mural, a mosaic accomplished by a master craftsman and artist. At one side is represented the pre-industrial artisan whose horizons reached not much farther than his feet or ox-cart could carry him. On the other side are automated factories, jet planes and space ships. Between the two are pictured those technological innovations that, especially in the past century, have done so much to increase the worker's productivity and to diminish the meaning his work has for him. The mural could appropriately decorate a manufacturers association's headquarters, except for the figures in

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the center—a man, a woman and a child. The man is strong and handsome, reminiscent of a cigarette ad's version of "men of America"—never stained or sweaty. Without the industrial tools in his hands, and the remarkable development of his musculature, he might well be a middle-class suburbanite.

There are no picket lines in this grand panorama of labor in America, no portrayals of struggle or strife. Older forms of production fade into newer ones; the social landscape is neat and orderly. Missing are the slums, the riots, the unemployed, the underprivileged, the exploited. It is almost as if the new Federation had deliberately satirized those critics who complain that American labor organizations have surrendered in the battle to redeem society from inequity and injustice.

These critics—and there are a number of them inside the labor movement—view American unionism as an increasingly well-financed flop, as a partisan of the profit system, an atom-bomb foreign policy, and a Tweedle-dee Tweedle-dum party system. Unions own fancy buildings, pay their executives plush salaries, give them increasingly lush expense accounts, hire public relations experts and talk about problems of "union administration"—while the rank and file participate less and less in the management of union affairs.

What we have said in the preceding articles of this series does not rebut such criticism. Yet we have noted some dimensions of unionism not measured by this dour evaluation, have seen much that is heartening for the advocate of social, economic and political democracy. This is the way "the" labor movement frustrates and defeats all who seem to sum "it" up. Among its many components, moving in various directions as they do, can be found examples to support almost any commendation or condemnation one would care to contrive.

In terms of its goals, much of American unionism has been partly trapped by the notions of social reform generated by the American reaction to industrialism. The good life has been defined almost entirely in terms of less work for more pay, with enough broader legislation (and many unions have opposed even this) to keep such gains from being undermined by poverty in the larger society. This regularly reiterated "more," along with demands for "less" in the way of managerial powers of the unrestrained sort, once seemed to have almost revolutionary implications. Today it is part of the conventional scene. The steel strike slipped off the front pages in a few days.

Some enthusiasm and involvement seem to be generated around union participation in community services and civic activities and, sporadically, in politics. Yet there is no broad agreement among most unions as to how central a place should be given to such concerns or how they should be pursued. They remain an uncertain element in any estimate of American unionism's potential for new vigor and more democracy.

Proponents of internal union reform have at times argued that making labor organizations "truly democratic" would rekindle the zeal of the rank and file, as well as bring other benefits. But many factors contribute to the difficulty of determining what the form and extent of democracy within unions realistically can be. As unions penetrate further into the realm of authority that was once the monopoly of management, they need administrative continuity and the skills and experience that come with continuity. Collective bargaining itself has become more and more centralized, partly as a result of top leadership's self-aggrandizing strategy, partly because of the demand for industry-wide equalization of pay and benefits, partly because of the sheer complexity of the numerous problems dealt with by staff experts. All of this makes it more difficult for those in the lower ranks to challenge the leaders, or even for there to be any effective challenge from middle echelon officers who lack the publicity, public relations and organizational patronage available to the men in charge.

The Teamster Story

HOW FAR undemocratic practices can go, given the "right" combination of membership characteristics and leadership proclivities, has been shown in the Teamsters. It originated with a membership base largely of rough, poorly educated workmen among whom violence and the "easy buck" were accepted as normal. Old-timers still recall the days when "many of the wagon drivers were men without any home, who slept in the wagons or the hay lofts." Like so many other workers, they were completely under the thumb of bosses who were not hesitant to take advantage of their power. Such men were not adverse to knocking heads together to "persuade" fellow workers to join the union, nor did they feel many inhibitions, once the tables were turned, with respect to intimidating employers. In many places the Teamsters, like the building trades, soon became much more powerful than any of the individual employers with whom they had to "bargain," and this lopsided relationship further diminished the constraints felt by the leadership.

During the first quarter of the 20th Century, many segments of the Teamsters Union operated with a great deal of local autonomy, and the international union was often little more than a federation of "principalities." Neither employers nor members could appeal to a higher authority from whatever tactics local or district leaders found convenient, or from the avariciousness that has since been so well publicized. Drivers, working individually and in pairs, were especially dependent upon the business agent and lacked the natural organization and channels of communication of men who worked in shops or gangs.

Dave Beck began to mold this collection of "baronies" into an organization dominated by a centralized authority. Systematically, middle and lower echelons of leadership

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were created which owed him personal loyalty for financial favors and organizational patronage. His staff men were given good salaries and big expense accounts. From the usually weak employers he demanded and got continual improvements in wages, conditions and fringe benefits. When the international constitution got in his way and it was no longer convenient to disregard it, he had it amended! Over a decade ago officers' terms were changed from one to five years.

In a union of this type, education programs for ordinary members or for minor officers such as stewards, or even business agents, are seldom heard of. Other amenities of union democracy, such as membership participation in the formulation of contract demands or the administration of the contract, are equally minimal or absent. New officers and new business agents learn by doing, completely dependent upon the old-timers above them for advice and help when they flounder. One of the recurring problems for an honest Teamster official of a local with regional jurisdiction is how to wean a new business agent so that he is not afraid to act independently.

One honest Teamster local president suggested to us that "in time the rank and file will demand a housecleaning." But the average Teamster, even more than his local officers, is totally inexperienced in organizational affairs and subject to the punitive pressures which can be applied through the control over union affairs by the higher administration. If a measure of democracy is to come to the Teamsters in the near future, only a new and better leadership can introduce it—or some authority outside the union.

Though few unions are run by Hoffa-type executives, many of them lack any visible elements of an energetic internal democracy. Why is this? How is it possible that millions of workers can be hoodwinked, or bulldozed, or even strong-armed into passive acceptance of authoritarian and sometimes corrupt leadership year after year? How much of the lack of democracy results from the non-ideological character of the American working class, with their preoccupation with the pleasures and problems of family life and personal leisure?

The Hard Road of Opposition

THESE ARE not easy questions. They do not yield to easy answers. One *practical* problem is that there are some great difficulties confronting most would-be opponents to and critics of national union administrations. There is a general absence from union constitutions of anything approximating a bill of rights, a protection of the basic civil and political rights of members. And the key figure in the disciplinary procedure is usually the union president, who may be judging the case of a factional opponent. Frequently there is no time limit on trusteeships or receiverships through which the national administration may directly control local union government, and clauses governing disciplining of individual members are often vague. Under such circumstances even honest elections may provide only the façade of democracy.

An example of such limitations on union democracy was provided by the way the Steelworkers' administration handled the recent challenge of their tenure in office by a so-called "dues-protest" group. This agglomeration of dissident factions and individuals backed an unknown local officer of questionable competence, Donald Rarick, to replace David J. McDonald as president. The whole official machinery of the union was integrated into McDonald's campaign—the newspaper, "official" trips of administration officials throughout the country (expenses paid), special institutes for local and district officers (expenses paid), and so on.

Under Philip Murray the Steelworkers Union, from its inception in the '30's, enjoyed democracy in theory and a beneficent autocracy in practice. Many of the workers were immigrants adjusting to American ways in mill towns and metropolitan centers; their educational level was not high; business was conducted in a rough and tumble way, and sometimes still is. As a result of this "tradition," not every local is a shining example of the militant protection of treasured democratic procedures. During the recent election in one big local an extra ballot box turned up when it came time to ship the votes out for counting and auditing by an impartial agency. In another, a local officer (pro-McDonald), who had sworn that his union would have a fair election if he had to watch the polling place all day, went out for 10 minutes for coffee and a snack. When the ballots were counted it turned out that "nearly a thousand" members had "voted" in the few booths available during his brief absence!

In the Steelworkers 1958 convention efforts were made to "punish" the "dues protest" faction, even though they had already been defeated in election—so seriously did McDonald take the threat to his security. The dissident group was charged with "dual unionism," the union equivalent of disloyalty and subversion. Demonstrators with signs stood around until the "disloyal opposition" took the floor and then exploded into "spontaneous" demonstrations. One delegate's comment (he had supported McDonald) was: "Poor Dave had to have his pound of flesh." Others simply dismissed the performance as "corny."

The spectacle of an opposition being crushed seemed more alarming to outside observers than it did to most Steelworkers, whether pro- or anti-McDonald. If the pro-Rarick group had not been protected—as they were—from fines and expulsion by their own local unions, more Steelworkers might have been more worried. As it is, most of the local officers and middle echelon group charge it all up to "political realities" and McDonald's personality. Were that personality of a sort that creates

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the loyalty Reuther enjoys, or the near reverence accorded to Buckmaster of the Rubber Workers, attempts to tamper with elections and the administration's steam-roller convention tactics might not have been necessary.

As one old-time Steelworker, long a local officer, put it: "Frankly we've never had much democracy at the top. But below the top we've had democracy, and pretty lively democracy in many of our local unions." This is a frequent pattern. Members exercise some direct control over what they understand through personal experience. But above that level, an entrenched, bureaucratized administration "runs things," presumably for the benefit of all. Such an administration is constrained more by whatever tradition of responsibility to the rank and file had developed within the organization than by any formal constitutional provisions. Without a "lively democracy" locally, the potentialities for autocracy on top are very great.

Premium on Solidarity

YET IT must not be forgotten that some of the most sincerely democratic of the local leaders of the Steelworkers so feared the election of what they considered a thoroughly incompetent administration that they countenanced, even if they did not themselves indulge in, the undemocratic election and convention shenannigans. Struggling themselves with the apathy and ignorance of their memberships, on the one hand, and the complexities of the issues, on the other, they cannot bring themselves to risk placing more power in the hands of the rank and file. Their viewpoint is reminiscent of that of "liberal imperialism" resisting the "premature" grant of nationhood to colonial people, failing to see that the admittedly dangerous course of internal democratization and "the people" are not technically prepared for, or perhaps even adequately interested in it, may be necessary to create an effort toward competence, an arousing of concern, a striving for governmental wisdom.

A concerted drive to democratize the internal life of American unions could provide one of the really exciting political and educational experiments of our time. The consequences could reach far beyond the labor movement. But those who strive for such a goal, whether within the unions or as outside critics, are bucking resistance as broad as our general political apathy and as specific as the particular institutional commitments of the union as a bargaining and striking organization.

Unions by their nature are fighting organizations which place a premium on internal solidarity. Does this mean that they cannot afford or cannot achieve substantial membership participation in the shaping of union policy determination, or that the demand that they be "democratic" should be considered unrealistic? If so, the integrity of the labor movement would depend almost entirely on keeping its rulers faithful to the ideals for which unions come into being and benign in the exercise of their power. Likewise, if members of unions do not want to be mixed up in policy controversies, if they are apathetic, even when alternate choices are available to them—then, too, genuine internal democracy cannot be created or sustained. For no society and no organization can be considered democratic unless there is a genuine choosing by its members from among alternative policies. Without this, honest elections, dedicated officials and safeguards for the rights of individuals may only camouflage what at best is a benign paternalism, an idealistic autocracy.

This means that unionists must know and understand the issues confronting organized labor generally and their own associations in particular. We found almost everywhere a concern for the "breakdown in communications" between the leadership and the rest of the membership, especially in the larger locals. A dedicated, hard-working AFL-CIO regional director's remarks are typical: "How should leaders communicate? We use papers, meetings, personal contacts, speeches, everything. Labor leadership does a better job trying to communicate than does the rank and file. How'n hell do you do it when they don't even attend labor meetings?"

Yet such officers insist that the union newspaper can not be utilized as a forum for debate between candidates for union office, or even for policy controversy when no elections are pending. An Auto Workers official argued that "such matters should not go beyond the recording secretary. We thresh them out in the union hall and then instruct our delegates, if we want to, on how to represent us at the higher levels. Publication of our controversies might weaken the union's hand. Management would know of any divisions in our ranks and would try to stir up dissent during bargaining negotiations even after a majority of the membership had taken a stand."

The point cannot be easily dismissed. When a labor organization establishes policy with respect to bargaining demands, whether directly by majority vote in a referendum or indirectly through representatives to some policy committee or delegates to a national convention, it is not passing laws which then take effect and must be obeyed by all. It is creating a battle plan which may require the sacrifices of a strike to carry out. The strategic value placed upon consensus, solidarity and, if it can be mustered, enthusiasm cannot be overestimated.

As a result, all communication media, except the spoken word within the privacy of a union meeting, are directed at combatting divisiveness. "Factionalism" is a dirty word, not because unionists automatically detest opposition (obviously, some union officers do), but because there is no way of assuring that an opposition faction will not undermine negotiations or even a strike in order to promote the defeat of those in power at the next election.

Al Zack of the public relations department of the AFL-CIO expresses the union attitude toward its own

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news media by saying that "the paper must reflect the viewpoint of the organization *after* it has been determined, but not the controversy during the process of debate." Thus, the *AFL-CIO News* has dealt with corruption and Communism, but not with other internal issues of the labor movement. It reports the facts on corruption scandals even if the officials under attack are still inside the Federation. It also gives some accurate coverage to reports from departments but does not go into the arguments which may lie behind them. For example, the controversy between the Steelworkers, supported by the Industrial Union Department and the Metal Trades Department, is not aired and explained.

But explaining the content and significance of many issues confronting unions is extremely difficult under the best conditions. The analyses which research departments prepare for top officers or for use in training institutes may run into dozens of pages of fine print about wage structures, the economic situation of the industry or the implications of fringe benefits. Most members would certainly not read them, and a great many could not understand them if they did read them. Union newspapers sometimes print simplified summaries, but they produce only those facts and only those interpretations of facts calculated to win support for the decisions already reached.

One hears the complaint that, in any case, elections in most local unions are little more than personality contests ("political beauty contests") or irrational desires based on heaven knows what, either to throw the "ins" out or to retain them. Under the present conditions, which so restrict the flow of information and the stimulation of informed controversy, it is hard to see how election campaigns in local unions could be any more meaningful. While a case can be made for keeping policy controversy "within the family," it seems harder to justify the amount of censorship of news in union papers with respect to internal election campaigns. In almost every union the newspaper during an election, whether a local paper or the national publication, *is* used as an instrument of political propaganda by the incumbent officers.

Don't Rock the Boat

STILL, THE decline of "factionalism" cannot be attributed simply to the uses or misuses of the labor newspaper. There is almost inevitably, it seems, a process by which as labor organizations develop and mature, "some of the motion," as a staff man put it, "goes out of the movement." A state representative for the ILGWU sums up his organization's experience: "Ultimately, the older unions have a great deal of 'stability'."

It is also frequently said that the new generation of workers lack understanding of the struggles out of which unionism has grown, and partly in consequence lack the will to struggle themselves. "The kids don't appreciate the past and the sacrifices the older people had to make," a Wisconsin AFL-CIO official says, "They simply let things come and go. We need to fight for our position. The whole movement and especially the kids are more interested in security nowadays." But another union leader in Wisconsin, while agreeing that the present membership is less militant and idealistic, in part because of union gains, reminded us that "unions also are not as prone to foster strikes, precipitate violence and so on."

"It used to be," a Machinist officer says, "that we would strike over a difference of two or three or four cents an hour on wages. Now we try to avoid strikes and to work out settlements. It used to be that when we went on strike, you'd go to the landlord and tell him to hold his horses, he'd get paid when it was settled. Now you have to think of the responsibilities of workers as time-payment consumers and the problems they have with families that are used to a certain standard of living. We have become accustomed to the loose belt. Besides, working people are not poor people any more, and a few cents doesn't mean that much to them."

It is at a point such as this that the anti-democratic dialectic between rank-and-file apathy and administrative autocracy is resolved into an almost singular pressure against the birth of any new vigor for American unionism to be expressed by new organizational forms. The leadership, pressing for security in office plus the expanding fringe benefits that accompany the shift from stewardship to executiveship, do not "rock the boat" by raising fundamentally new issues. They pursue the tried and true formulas with all the tenacity of their corporation counterparts, often lacking even a somewhat autonomous research arm to slip in a new idea occasionally. And individual members who do want more to say about their union and the direction it is carrying them are blocked; they have neither access to the union mass media nor realistic opportunities to organize support for their aspirations.

Certainly potential new issues abound in the age of automation—especially in those more privileged industries where the older economic gains are most extensive and secure. There are possibilities for reorganizing work, for giving new and richer meanings to the work experience. The old dream of a more democratic shop life is technologically and accounting-wise more possible now than ever before. The whole concept of the factory as a kind of quasi-military organization can realistically be reappraised.

Those who would like to see a more lively, informed, interested, militant, participating rank and file can still find union leaders who share their views, and even some who are willing to work on "reasonable" suggestions as to how it is to be done. Unfortunately, most suggestions sound like they involve great expense, a restructuring of much of the union movement, a change in its functions,

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and probably some alteration of American national character! Union leaders may perhaps be forgiven for not feeling up to the effort; but they certainly should not be forgiven for not maintaining and improving basic democratic safeguards that would facilitate and protect that minority which wants to play an active part.

Right of Appeal

SOME "realists" with whom this question was discussed maintain that the concept of Federation supervision of the "ethical practices" of national unions can be made use of more effectively in policing freedom of speech, fair elections, suspension or administration of locals by national offices and trial and punishment of members who have allegedly violated union regulations. The last two procedures, especially, have sometimes been used to crush opposition to incumbent leadership.

The Auto Workers review board, made up of leading citizens outside the union movement, is another attempt to provide a quasi-judicial final review of cases of disgruntled members who have charged that their rights have been violated. While many approve of the board as an improvement over previous grievance procedures, criticisms have also been levelled against it—especially that the review board members are guided neither by a reliable body of precedent, nor by real knowledge of unions.

The Supreme Court in the past several decades has developed a body of precedent with respect to decisions intended to safeguard members' rights *within* voluntary associations—churches, unions, even the Ku Klux Klan. This kind of judicial review may help resolve some conflicts between the unions' obligations as democratic associations and their strategic needs as both militant and, in a sense, managerial institutions. Arthur Goldberg predicts that there will be increasing use of court review in cases involving union members' rights in the coming years—for better or for worse.

We have learned that unions are capable of generating their own form of industrial tyranny, but also remembered that most of them have not. In most industries the daily life of the local union is dominated by the continuous need to defend contractual gains against the apathy of rank-and-file members in the face of frequent evasions or violations by lower echelon management, on the one hand, and by the obligation to prevent violations by ignorant or unconcerned workers on the other. Inevitably the rank and file sometimes feel as if they are subject to two "managements," even though one of them is presumed to be on their side and has been elected by them.

(HOFFMANN: Democracy, however you look at it, is an ideal, an ideal to guide the conduct of the unions, either as national organizations or as locals. We might as well make up our minds to the fact that democracy, no matter how brightly it burns as an ideal, cannot be applied everywhere and in all circumstances. The voting rank and file does not have the background to check the national union's interpretation of Taft-Hartley or of a state's right to work law. The rank and file does not have the background to check the financial books of the union, perhaps not even the books of their smaller local. Even within the dimensions of a democratic union system, many things must be taken on trust. Where one cannot possibly know everything, one must accept the work of those in a position to know and to be experts. It seems that Americans everywhere, but especially within the unions, are confronted with the task of learning new and more effective ways of "checking the checker.")

(SEIDMAN: While there are serious limitations upon effective democracy at the national level of American unions, they are generally democratic at the local level. Extension of this local democracy runs into the control of the channels of communication by the union head and his ability to build a political machine using the union payroll to reward his supporters, as well as the lack of formal constitutional protections for any organized opposition. At the same time demands are made upon union administrations to prevent members from violating any contract provisions, from "wildcatting," and from other autonomous actions which might disturb the stability of industrial relations. Granting that we want responsible behavior, it seems to me that unions as a group have swung too far in the direction of discipline, at the expense of freedom.)

(BLOOMBERG: Union leaders, however radical with respect to the institutions of the larger society, seldom are inclined toward "democratic experiments" *within* the organization though there are a few exceptions, such as the Auto Workers. But there isn't much utopianism left in any of our systems any more. Even liberal critics of the labor movement often seem to feel embarrassed by aspirations for unionism as a potential force for social reform, dismissing them as a kind of nostalgia for the ferment of the New Deal era or acknowledging that one cannot hope for too much in the face of a social science-y "realism" that takes note of such "inevitable" facts of life as "institutionalization" and "bureaucratization." We call for honest administration and improved constitutions, but nothing too visionary—and then complain that unionism has lost its social idealism, its drive for a new and better kind of industrial society. Perhaps we would serve both democracy and unionism better if we recovered something of that utopian orientation that once led intellectuals sympathetic to unionism to imagine and propose schemes for a political democracy within the organization and direction of work, and for other kinds of freedom in the workplace, too—freedom from unnecessary boredom, freedom for creativity, freedom to make the experience of work more meaningful and fulfilling. Any idealistic union leaders today must look long and hard among their critics to find an alternative to narrow ideological doctrines, on the one hand, and the bland "conventional wisdom," on the other.)

This is the last of eight articles. Reprints may be ordered from THE NEW REPUBLIC, *1244 19th Street, N. W., Washington 6, D. C. (Single copy 35 cents; 10 copies $3; 50 copies $12; 100 copies $20.)*

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The Superficial Aspect

Memorial for FDR

ALMOST AS its last gasp Congress adopted a resolution authorizing the President to set aside 27 acres in the District of Columbia and to spend $150,000 on plans for a memorial to Franklin D. Roosevelt.

It was a hasty and ill-advised action that ought to be rescinded. The time is not yet for a memorial to Roosevelt. At least 10 years, more likely 20 or 30, must pass before we can plan his memorial intelligently. This generation, indeed, can never plan it because men now in the prime of life will not live long enough to know exactly what Roosevelt did that is most worth memorializing.

We know what action he took in specific circumstances. We usually know, and we can almost always guess what he intended to do; but what we shall be, said the Apostle, "doth not yet appear," and what we shall be in, say, 1980, depends on whether Roosevelt's acts served his purpose or defeated it. Until the question can be answered with reasonable assurance, let the lapidarian recorder stay his hand; for nothing is more justly derided than a stately monument to the wrong thing.

Undue haste in creating his memorial would be but a left-handed compliment to Roosevelt. It might attest the ardor of his friends, but it would also hint at a lurking fear in their minds that he may be, or can be forgotten; yet if he really was what millions of Americans believe he was, namely, the sixth President of the first order of greatness, the passage of time will make his quality more, not less, conspicuous. If he was less than that, then his monument should not occupy 27 acres.

The three truly magnificent memorials thus far erected in Washington do not represent in any case the apotheosis of a man; they are tributes to three aspects of greatness. They bear the names of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln, but they exalt integrity, liberty and humanity, served nobly by the three men.

What, then, should we celebrate under the name of Roosevelt? The moment the question is asked, argument begins, and until there is no longer any argument about it the structure should not be designed.

There are those of us who believe that no adequate understanding of the man is possible now, or will be possible until we have acquired a much more satisfactory grasp of the historical affiliation of Wilson and Roosevelt. It is already evident that the relation of these two statesmen has no exact parallel in earlier experience. Perhaps the nearest is the relation of Pius and Marcus Antoninus. That of Julius and Augustus Caesar serves to the extent that Augustus finished what Julius started; and that of Cosimo and Lorenzo de' Medici serves to the extent that Wilson was as dour as Cosimo and Roosevelt as dazzling as Lorenzo. But the relation of the Antonines is better because both Pius and Marcus Aurelius were students of the theory of government, and what the predecessor merely adumbrated, the successor worked out in detail and applied.

Of course the parallel, never exact, breaks off abruptly. Perish the impious thought of the estimable Mr. Truman as an American Commodus!

Wilson's announced goal was to "make the world safe for democracy," and in view of the precarious state of democracy at this moment it cannot be claimed that what Wilson started Roosevelt finished. But he did continue the effort, and there are those of us who believe that he advanced it more than a step or two. This is one link between the men.

Another is the fact that between them they brought this republic triumphantly through three terrific crises—two wars and one depression—in which most of the great nations of the world crashed, and all but two were reduced and enfeebled. This achievement may have been futile; tomorrow it may be obliterated in the general holocaust of civilization. But if it endures, history will regard it as gigantic. It was, however, a joint achievement, each man supplying an indispensable part.

BUT whether development of the theory and practice of government, or achievement of the national destiny be regarded as the more important purpose of statecraft, the two men worked along the same line. Hence when the dust and smoke have settled enough for us to perceive clearly what was the permanent accomplishment of this bloody and thunderous era—and it is the permanent accomplishment only that deserves a great memorial—it seems highly probable that we shall find neither man symbolizes it completely without the other.

That, however, is not yet disclosed, and until it is we had best go easy with the marble and bronze. Otherwise, merciless time may expose us as praising Leonardo merely for his excellent lute-playing.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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BOOKS & COMMENT

A Good Girl is Hard to Find

by T. J. Ross

ONE OF THE high spots of John Wain's *The Contenders* treats of a visit made by the narrator-hero to the garret-studio of his best friend, a struggling painter. The description of the artist's workshop, stink-filled with odors from the community kitchen below, littered with antique furnishings and loitering bugs, all presided over by the artist's helpmeet, a horrendous

A Travelling Woman
by John Wain
(St. Martins; $3.95)

frump, is capped off by the narrator's description of his own efforts to get some sleep when he stays the night. As he tosses and turns on his broken-springed bed, he assures the reader: "I thought about Life . . . I won't burden the story with details of what I thought about it."

Although Wain's most recent novel, *A Travelling Woman* is not told in the first person (we are brought toward the action in the old-fashioned way, from several points of view), the same proscription on Deep Thoughts about Life holds. Thus, when the solicitor-hero of this novel finds himself, like the journalist-hero of the *The Contenders,* trying vainly to catch some sleep in a shabby attic bed, located above the bedroom where his mistress and her husband lie reposing, it is not his thoughts about Life's Complex Dilemmas which the reader is treated to, but rather, a description of this sort:

> George Links rolled on to his back and stared moodily at the ceiling. The attic had no curtain on its small window, and the thin, sharp 7 a.m. light had woken him. Not that he had been at all deeply asleep; indeed, it seemed to him that he could remember everything that had happened during the night, a tedious chronicle of shiftings from left to right, vague noises from the street, fishings under the pillow for his handkerchief, and patches of extra loud ticking from his watch.

There may not be a Universal Thought about the Nature of Love or the Portents of Evil in that passage, but the quick dab about "fishings under the pillow for his handkerchief" has a universality of reference all its own. This sort of reminder of the workings of the "human-all-too-human" even in the most romantic-seeming dilemmas of daily life works as a controlling lever in the art of the so-called Angry Men. This control derives from a Falstaffian humor, a kind which scores as much off the central subject as off any other object. This self-chiding is there in Wain, or Osborne, as it is, say, in Shakespeare, or Laurence Sterne, or George Meredith, or Henry James. It is often the hallmark of a writer who enjoys recreating from humanity as it is, rather than from how he would like it to be.

A Travelling Woman is an interesting failure. Except for our interest in watching a talented and thoughtful writer set about "solving" a problem he has laid out for himself in fictional terms, we find little here to keep us going. And we recall how *The Contenders*, an earlier better, "thicker" book than this one, nonetheless got bogged down midway, without managing to regain momentum. *The Contenders* gets off to a good start as Wain describes the schooldays of his soon-to-be-contending characters; his description of the school system by which they are shaped and driven is brilliant and authoritative. His pitting off of the artist, Robert Lamb, against the businessman, Ned Roper, is perhaps a bit too neat, but he does succeed in launching them on their careers in such a way that the reader becomes interested in their fate. Like the other "angries," Wain leans on metaphors drawn from military experience to illuminate how young people of talent but no connections feel nowadays "in their beginnings," as, I daresay, they always will: "It was rather like waiting to go out on a raid into enemy territory; we had our iron rations, our rope-soled shoes, pocket compasses and the rest of it."

But once his cast of ragged and rugged characters have begun closing in on their various goals, Wain calls a halt, and decides to introduce a Nice Girl into the proceedings. Except for the hero's mother, no nice character had been, up to this point, anywhere in sight. The Nice Girl is introduced, obviously, to represent the alternative to what otherwise appears to be the sobering theme of the novel: that Life is One Big Scrounge. The Nice Girl, a peasant lass named Pepina, is presented as the answer, first of all, to the Dumb Blonde for whose favors both Lamb and Roper contend. (They solve this conflict by marrying her, one after the other.) Pepina is also the answer to another sort of dilemma which is diagnosed thus:

> I was sickened when I thought of the hordes of identical girls walking about Hampstead and Chelsea each one with the same pony tail and the same tight trousers as the next one, all looking for husbands and perfectly ready to settle in the provinces and devote the rest of their lives to being brave about it. But my nausea didn't get any better when I thought of the prospect of marrying a local girl.

Nor does it get any better when he thinks of the upper suburbia to which Ned Roper has successfully aspired:

> It was much too refined. Every neat little house breathed refinement and money and Soul. A worldly kind of soul, the sort you acquire by trips to Italy and first editions and dinners that don't taste like much but cost a lot of money.

AGAINST all such treacherous pressures nice Pepina is posed. She had been discovered by the artist on a trip to Italy, after his success, and brought back to London so his friend, Joe, could discover her too and decide in turn, to "rescue" her from both unsteady artist and unfeeling businessman and bring her safely back to the provinces and to his mother, away from all contending and contention. But the reader never really cares who gets Pepina, for she remains a lifeless figurine rather than a vital figure; she is the final trophy, the hapless sym-

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bol of the Happy Alternative. Since she doesn't know English she can't very well speak her mind among all the other contestants; the only thing we are told about her is that she acts "natural," a word Wain drops like a finishing school matron bragging about the winning deportment of her charges, or like Helena Rubinstein's cooing to consumers about how "natural" they may make their hair-roots seem by using her brand of cream. (Why, in modern life, should the average female be expected to act any more "natural" than the average male-on-the-make?) *The Contenders* sags badly as it runs afoul the irrelevant silences of a stock literary peasant.

The device doesn't work in *A Travelling Woman*, either. Once again we get a natural-seeming woman who doesn't talk much. The incident on which the action of this novel hinges is a quickie affair between a young solicitor and a speechless wonder named Ruth Cowley. Before meeting Ruth, George's problem had been boredom. The novel opens as George's alert young wife, Janet, tells him what to do: "Well, as I keep saying . . . I think psychoanalysis would help you." An eye-catching opening sentence, this; almost too chic to be good. But a bit of chic fun is not to be sneezed at, and so the reader settles back, anticipating a display of the rib-tickling comic razzle-dazzle which he has enjoyed before on Wain's fiction.

Easy-going George agrees to be psychoanalyzed, hoping that such an adventure will show him the way "to anchor this floating body of resentment to some fixed point outside myself." It is arranged that George board in the attic of a town couple during the one evening a week which he must spend away from home in order to be analyzed. George begins to think of himself as the Man in the Attic in a way, we would pause to note, that is more typical of literary birds than of legal beagles. There is much about George which is rather unlawyerlike—his habit, for example, of reciting Yeats to himself when he feels blue. In contrast to the hero of *The Contenders*, from whom we do get a sense of what it "feels like" to be a provincial journalist, we never actually believe in George as a man of law.

The Man in the Attic is soon bowled over, not by his analyst, whom he quickly drops, but by the style of his landlady, for hers is a style of "unforced naturalness." Once that sinker is dropped comedy ceases, and a basement dampness sets in. Part of the dampness exudes from the sheer cliché into which efforts to describe Ruth topple. We are told that Ruth has "pensive eyes lit by what seemed the glow of a hidden fire." At this one, I began wondering if the comic tale were to be transformed into a jolly Tale of Terror. Or was Ruth Cowley going to turn into a Thomas Hardy girl? That would be fine, but if she were a Thomas Hardy girl, then the novel had better show a Thomas Hardy power, for such girls require more than random comic fireworks to illuminate them justly. Furthermore, they are capable of superb speeches about themselves and their turmoil and their fate.

But Ruth Cowley doesn't talk. Why Ruth should desire to admit George to her embraces is not made clear (there is some play about Ruth's philosopher husband being in a state of funk, but, unless Ruth is a hysterical type, this in itself is not a convincing enough goad for her actions). Ruth remains, like Pepina, just another piece on the board to be moved this way and that. She is never allowed to assert herself in her own dignity and her own right.

And there will be no Getting-To-Know-You nonsense in what Ruth warns George from the start is going to be an interim affair. It follows that, "The passion she had given . . . was . . . as mindless as the warmth of the bed, as empty of meaning as the darkness in which they lay." Yet at first, George is so jazzed up by his adventure with Ruth that he begins acting in a warmer way toward his wife, who, in consequence, is very pleased at what she takes to be the positive results of his analysis. When she learns of the real cause behind the change in the domestic weather, she falls into the waiting arms of George's best friend, Captax. The friend, however, must keep one hand free to fend off the advances of his ex-mistress, while the ex-mistress' husband commences to stalk George, whom he has mistaken for his wife's lover.

NOBODY wins anything; there is a line in Auden's translation of *The Magic Flute* which, at this stage of their affairs, each of the characters would especially respond to: "Heartless gods! Must I remain alone?" Alone they do remain at story's end. Love-making is no answer to boredom or loneliness or chagrin. Yet there is very little in the novel of either love-making or women. When

The Night You Slept

(From the Italian of Cesare Pavese)

EVEN the night resembles you,
the distant night that weeps
muted, deep within the heart.
The stars pass wearied.
Cheek touches cheek—
it is a cold shiver, someone
struggles and implores you, alone,
lost in you, in your fever.

Night suffers and longs for dawn,
poor heart which is startled.
O closed face, dark anguish,
fever that saddens the stars,
there is one like you awaiting the sunrise,
searching your face in silence.
You are spread out under the night
like a closed dead horizon.
Poor heart which is startled,
one faraway day you were the dawn.

NORMAN THOMAS DI GIOVANNI

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either of these great subjects is brought in range, the result is banal or perfunctory. Wain's strong suit, here, as in *The Contenders,* is in his delineation of male friendships. Whenever Links and Captax meet to exchange confidences, or to hatch a plot against the girls, the story comes to life. Here, for example, is a subtle pin-pointing of a basic type of modern friendship, that between a respectably-situated male and his disreputable best buddy:

". . . . I'm longing to talk about Ruth, and you're about the only person I can do that with. Firstly because you know her, and secondly because—" He faltered.

"Secondly," said Captax smoothly, "because you think of me as an immoralist who won't despise you for running after another man's wife when you've got a nice little wife of your own at home."

"Not exactly. It would be more accurate to say that I don't care whether you despise me or not."

"Same thing, George."

They drank silently, each feeling the nature of their relationship as irksome and yet unwilling to risk ending it. They had been like this for years; Captax sometimes compared them with galley-slaves who had grown used to being chained to the same oar. "We'd be equally lost without the oar and without each other," he would say.

Why is it that the representation of the female has in much of the new fiction, been so banal? Is it that the English writers have so far (like their American cousins) been refusing to recognize the fact that women suffer too?

A Revolt of Conscience

by Christian Gerhard

PROFESSOR RITTER, whose book was first published in 1954 and now appears in a competent translation by R. T. Clark, was himself an active member of the German resistance to Hitler. His account centers around Carl Goerdeler, the unofficial head of the non-Communist resistance. Up until his last days in jail, Goerdeler was a voluminous writer and a surprising amount of this material was recently made available.

The German Resistance
by Gerhard Ritter
(Praeger $7.50)

Goerdeler was the fifth generation of his family to be in the Prussian civil service. His whole background was conservative in the extreme. It is no accident that he was a leading figure in the Resistance since so many of its elements were conservative: civil servants, church figures, army officers and the aristocracy. However Goerdeler, through his practical work in local politics, had ample contacts with Social Democrats and came to respect them. In his extensive plans for a future Germany he stressed the importance of an educated working-class with good leadership.

Goerdeler resigned as mayor of Leipzig in 1936 over the removal of a statue of Mendelssohn by the Nazis. He had managed up until then to mitigate if not stop the worst activities of the party, showing great personal courage and resourcefulness. He was then "employed" by the electrical firm of Bosch in Stuttgart, who financed and covered his extensive trips abroad in the cause of the Resistance.

One of the shattering aspects of the years 1936-39 was the almost complete lack of encouragement and assistance received by the German opposition from abroad. Nowhere does one sense the tragedy of the appeasement policy as clearly. An army *coup d'état* was fully planned under Beck in 1938 but it failed to materialize when Czechoslovakia was thrown to the wolves.

From the outset, the German Resistance was in a peculiar position. It was never fighting a foreign power and its various elements were often in disagreement about practical policies. It was an idealistic revolt of decent people against barbarism. To the last, Goerdeler himself opposed the murder of Hitler. He wanted to capture him alive and force him to see the folly of his ways! It was a curious weakness of Goerdeler's to overrate the power of objective ideas and reason in politics. He attributed his successes to his plans and policies, whereas his leading role was won primarily because of personal magnetism and complete integrity.

In understanding present-day Germany it is useful to realize that thousands upon thousands of intelligent, decent Germans were killed during the Nazi period. (One authority says that 51,000 people died in Buchenwald alone where there were no foreigners until 1943. 7,000 is a reliable estimate of those executed in connection with the attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944). Others went through such harrowing experiences that they were not fit for post-war political battles. (To point out how many millions the Germans slaughtered, a typical response, does not in any way alter the fact.) These people might have made the hard core of a New Germany. The amazing reconstruction after both world wars was essentially only an economic one. The vacuum created by the ignominious exile of the Kaiser at the very moment of defeat has never been filled. It is erroneous to think of the Resistance as fighting for democracy. It was not the authoritarianism of Hitler as such which called forth the opposition, but his manifest breaking of the ten commandments and social traditions. The tragic failure of Weimar is not forgotten, and it is interesting to note that the East Zone has used the advent of Hitler to power

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through quasi-democratic machinery as an argument against free, all-German elections.

Certainly one is aware today of the lack of consecrated, effective leadership in West Germany. Living there for any length of time one comes to sense that while Germany exists as a geographic, economic and cultural unit, it has somehow lost its soul. The Hitler era is undigested by those who lived through it as adults and the school children are inadequately taught about it, if at all.

The problems raised in Ritter's book can only be touched on in such a short space. The central question, the usefulness and effectiveness of the Resistance, he writes about movingly. In his conclusion he says: "The history of the Resistance movement is the history of a failure. . . . It was a revolt simply of conscience." There was a vast amount of talk and planning, courageous personal sacrifice, but the members of the movement were not ruthless enough to be successful. They were not prepared to alter their conduct by one iota from that expected of gentlemen and good Germans. They could not stab their own soldiers in the back or encourage reprisals by large-scale sabotage. Nothing must be attempted which might reduce the country to chaos and defenselessness. Ritter writes:

> To fail is human and there is no assurance of victory to anyone. But what matters in the end is that the battle for good was fought whatever the dangers, and even in situations in which to worldly wisdom failure is certain, simply because conscience, the consciousness of one's duty, has said: "None the less—fight." Where there is no such will to fight, the will that thinks no longer of life and will hear nothing of "failure," there Satan has definitely won.

"WELL, WELL, IT TURNS OUT *that Dale Alford of Little Rock, who unseated Congressman Brooks Hays in the 1958 elections,* was *the people's choice after all. The Liberals' god-democracy has turned against their god-integration. We ask them, What do you recommend, gentlemen? Shall we, having failed to dissipate the plurality in Arkansas for segregation, do away with democracy—at least in that electoral district? La Rochefoucauld captured the dilemma of the Liberals when he sighed, 'Sad is the lot of the woman who is at once violently inflamed and inflexibly virtuous!'"*

From the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW. Write to Dept. N-6, 150 E. 35 St., New York 16, N.Y., for free copy.

Inflation Again

by Robert Lekachman

TWO YEARS AGO the Joint Economic Committee of Congress invited forty-seven leading economists to write essays on the causes of inflation, the sources of economic growth, and the reconciliation between rising prices and expanding output. The papers which emerged naturally focused on the peculiar behavior of prices during the 1957-1958 recession, in particular their tend-

Inflation—Cause and Cure
by Leon Keyserling
(Conference on Economic Progress; $.50)

ency to rise at a time when sales and employment were declining. As a writer in *The American Economic Review* classified the major positions, there were four identifiable emphases—not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first extended the traditional judgment that prices rise because the stock of money increases. Sometimes there is a time lag, so that the increased prices of the late recession reflected the credit expansions of the past. If the causes of inflation are basically monetary, so are the remedies. Members of this school of thought would keep a tight rein on the supply of money and a close watch on interest rates.

What are the alternatives to this analysis? A second group agree that money is an important influence upon price levels, but deny that it is the only important factor. They believe that prices rise in part because there are still a great many elements of monopoly in American industry. Controlling the money supply does nothing to halt monopoly exploitation of the general public. The appropriate remedy is stricter enforcement of the Sherman Act and other anti-trust laws. If necessary, the largest units should be broken up and competition restored.

The position of the third group is a bit harder to describe. Like the opponents of monopoly, they suspect that market prices reflect the concentration of economic power as well as the size of money stocks. But their analysis stresses administered prices rather than monopoly in the cruder sense of the word. In many industries, a single firm—usually but not invariably the largest enterprise—announces its prices and the other members of the industry promptly conform to them. Typically, these prices endure for months or years, even in the face of changing demand. Occasionally price leaders raise prices as demand slackens, much in the manner of the auto companies who reacted to a disastrous year by upping the prices of 1958 models. Administered prices are not the same as monopoly prices because there is rivalry among the firms based upon styling, advertising, and quality. Economists who emphasize administered prices tend to be skeptical of monetary solutions to the control of inflation. For if price leaders raise prices regardless of market conditions, a contraction of the money supply which limits demand will not necessarily reduce prices.

The last group of economists contains the sternest critics of Federal Reserve policies. In their opinion, too much emphasis has been placed on stable price levels and the much more vital objective of economic growth has been neglected. While these economists are not inflationists, many of them would willingly sacrifice some price stability in exchange for higher investment and more rapid growth. Professor Ruggles of Yale, a leader of this group, complained that present policies led to an unfortunate result,

> . . . any growth that is achieved must be crowded into a small space of time; all the rest of the time will be recession, recovery from recession, or levelling off prior to going into recession.

To this writer, the comment on present Federal Reserve attitudes is perfectly fair. When prices rise, Chairman Martin hastens to restrict credit. When prices are stable as they have been during the last year, Mr. Martin restricts credit for fear that they will rise.

If the unfortunate layman concludes from this discussion that economists don't agree about one of their oldest problems, he is entirely correct. At the moment, a basic disagreement concerns the relative importance of monetary forces. According to the economist's

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position in this debate, he will display greater or lesser confidence in the efficacy of measures which seek to stabilize prices by limiting the amount of credit and raising the rate of interest. For what it may be worth, I find the most plausible position a combination of Group 3 and Group 4. It seems hard to deny the importance of administered prices in autos, steel, electrical appliances, chemicals and a great many other important industries. Nor is it easy to deny that price stability has been over-emphasized. If the result of price stability is high unemployment, very few Americans will enjoy price stability.

Mr. Keyserling's latest pamphlet contains a strong statement of Group 4 opinions. In a forthright style, he indicts Republican economic policy for its studied neglect of the

> . . . three great purposes of our economic life . . . a high and sustained rate of economic growth sufficient to use fully our growing resources of manpower, plant and technology; attention to the great priorities of our national and international needs; and economic justice.

Paradoxically, the sacrifice of the essential has not even purchased the subordinate, for we have suffered more inflation than we incurred when the government followed policies better designed to promote economic expansion.

The popular conservative view that wage rises have forced prices up finds an enemy in Mr. Keyserling. In his judgment,

> . . . in the key administered price industries, there was a clear tendency, at least prior to the absolute economic recession, to raise prices more rapidly as the rate of economic growth slowed down.

It is not clear what "absolute economic recession" means and few economists would subscribe to the theory that large companies will refrain from raising prices as high as they can during periods of economic expansion. Why should they refrain? Mr. Keyserling does not favor price controls, but on his own arguments I fail to see why he should not desire, at a minimum, a public hearing board before which large enterprises would be required to present their case for price increases.

MR. KEYSERLING does not fear the bold statement. Most economists would demand more evidence before agreeing that credit restriction leads to more inflation than credit expansion. Mr. Keyserling is prone to exaggerate the influence of credit policies. It is not necessary to support the present policies of the Federal Reserve System (I do not) in order to suggest that we suffered recessions in 1947 and 1949 under a Democratic administration much more favorably disposed to low interest rates and liberal credit than the Eisenhower government. Moreover, banks are simply not as important as they used to be. To a considerable degree our business giants derive their funds from their own retained profits or from other institutional giants—insurance companies and the like. Economic expansion is, of course, influenced by monetary policy but monetary policy is only one of a number of forces which converge upon the economy.

Mr. Keyserling's rashness ought not disguise the importance of his major points. We should indeed worry less about rising prices and more about social and economic objectives of considerably larger importance, even if one is less confident than Mr. Keyserling that we will have price stability too, if we expand rapidly enough. As a device for focusing attention on our major national goals, Mr. Keyserling's specific, a *National Prosperity Budget*, has considerable merit. In his words, such a budget

> . . . should set forth . . . needed quantitative short-range and long-range goals for maximum employment, production and purchasing power. Properly defined, these goals include the great priorities of our needs, and the requirements of economic justice. Every main element in national economic policy, including the Federal Budget and monetary policy, should be made consistent with and conducive to the attainment of these goals.

In Redwoods

LEAVES HANG down jade patterns to our eyes
from trunks like braid that soar to blue and cloud;
a blue, electric easiness of jays
flashes in the redwoods of our mood,
moving shadow leaves on leaf translucencies,
fluttering luminous oakleaves through our dark
as we walk between old logs of burning green
where delicate, ruffled funguses repeat
diminished fans along a fallen bark.

My twigged stick touches moss that falls apart,
and sinuous bands of coral slip away—
a kingsnake sliding startled as we are
that there are people in his privacy.
Through his familiar forest, foreign forms,
we ponder those interiors of truth
(a deeper, antlered darkness closing in),
warned back by wild eyes that disapprove
intruders to their emerald point of view.

Then back through leafiness as if pursued
—Apollo touching Daphne in our thoughts
and clutching nothing but a branching wood—
we hear the dryads crying, forest-caught,
or think we do, prefer the fable to
leaves that dropped when parthenons were new,
saplings dappling light the day Christ died,
the year Columbus rode, another ring
in redwoods of inexorable time.

HAROLD WITT

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A Road Away from Destruction

by William B. Gould

LITERARY MEN with an active interest in politics are rare, politics today being looked upon as an ignominious pastime, fit only for petty talents. There are, however, a few who have used their artistry as a political weapon, and among those few, Alan Paton of South Africa is notable.

The world has come to know Mr. Paton as the author of *Cry, the Beloved Country* and as the creator of the artistically superior *Too Late the Phalarope*. It was in *Cry, the Beloved Country* that the terror, unrest, and inequality in South Africa was made vivid to many of us:

> We do not know, we do not know. We shall live from day to day, and put more locks on the doors, and get a fine fierce dog when the fine fierce bitch next door has pups, and hold on to our handbags more tenaciously; and the beauty of the trees by night and the raptures of the lovers under the stars, these things shall we forego. We shall forego the coming home drunken through the midnight streets and the evening walk over the star-lit veld. We shall be careful, and knock this off our lives, and knock that off our lives and hedge ourselves about with safety and precaution. And our lives will shrink, but they shall be the lives of superior beings; and we shall live with fear, but at least it will not be a fear of the unknown. And the conscience shall be thrust down; the light of life shall not be extinguished, but be put under a bushel, to be preserved for a generation that will live by it again, in some day not yet come; and how it will come, and when it will come, we shall not think about at all.

Such is the life that white South Africans have created for themselves.

Now Mr. Paton has written a political essay which it meant to root out despair that may have arisen in the minds of readers of his earlier books. He believes there is a road away from destruction, and he stakes out the signposts along the road. *Hope for South Africa* begins with an explanation of the word "liberal" as understood in South Africa and the identification of the author with the Liberal Party. Paton writes of the Dutch and their relationship to the English and to the native African:

> So it was that the struggle to survive on a dangerous continent became the main thought of the *trekboer's* mind, the main purpose of the *trekboer's* life. Like the thorn tree, which was to play a large part as a poetic symbol in his literature a century later, he put his roots down into the rock and stone, and in the face of all calamity survived. His enmity with the black man was bitter and relentless, as was the black man's enmity with him.

The rise of the Africaner over both native and Englishman is traced up to the present Nationalist government and its policy of apartheid.

Mr. Paton notes the simple and terrible fact that "the political power in South Africa is almost entirely in the hands of the white people," whose only choice is between "revolution or revolutionary evolution." He wishes to fight the good fight through the Liberal Party, in cooperation with other like-minded organizations, using both political and non-political means to bring white men to their senses before violence makes conciliation utterly impossible

But, as Paton himself admits, the task will not be easy. The realities of Nationalist control are harsh and hold out little hope. The tragedy is that by the time the white man is able to love, the natives may be able only to hate.

Hope for South Africa
by Alan Paton
(Praeger; $2.50)

ART

Spate at the Tate

THE IMAGE most of us retain of the Romantic Movement is of a torrent pouring down from craggy cliffs, splashing this way and that, lost in the shrubbery, dancing in the light, obeying no particular law except that of gravity and the transcendental urge to go on and on and on.

This being so, the one big exhibition in London this summer—"The Romantic Movement" at the Tate Gallery—had an exhausting appropriateness in the scope and the sheer size. Like that mountain torrent the show poured all over the rooms at the Tate and overflowed into the Arts Council Gallery to ring up a total of 975 items on view, including, besides paintings and sculpture, prints and drawings, books and bindings, manuscripts, medals and models, toys and novelties. Under the heading of "Toys and Novelties" appeared some interesting early devices that led eventually to the motion picture and the motion picture is exactly the form needed for this immense, yet, oddly enough, incomplete, essay on the spirit of a time.

That painting and literature can be exhibited together to their mutual illumination was demonstrated brilliantly last spring at the Corcoran, in Washington, with "The American Muse," which managed to trace parallel courses for words and paint through 300 years of American art production. The method there was the only one, except for a movie or a book, in which the trick can be turned. The literature was represented by itself, not by its mere name. Just as individual paintings were present to the eye, so individual quotations from poetry, fiction and essays were present to the mind. The big show at the Tate, trying for basically the same kind of correlation, was content with the mere names of writers and works of the Romantic movement. The actual books were present in glass cases, but such a presentation demanded the viewer's not merely general but specific acquaintance with relevant passages. Few of us carry around in our heads the kind of anthology needed; hence the result was the

Notes on Contributors

T. J. ROSS is on the faculty of Wayne State University. CHRISTIAN GERHARD has just returned from a long stay in Germany. WILLIAM B. GOULD makes his first appearance as a critic in this issue.

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same as if the painting section had contented itself with the names, Delacroix, Gericault, Constable and so on. The inclusion of manuscripts by Burns and Byron, Shelley and Coleridge really added nothing to the mention of their names already made by the books. On the other hand, the motion picture, by isolating single lines and reading them as the eye does, could have used these materials to great advantage.

When the show moved from books to bindings, a whole new, extra-art area of an essentially artistic phenomenon opened up; the viewer felt alternately irritated at being shown medals of famous people and bindings created for kings, and differently irritated at not being shown more. If Romanticism is being treated as a manifestation of a spirit playing in more things than art, then why not architecture, dress and landscape gardening? Especially in England the Romantic Movement produced significant examples of gardens and buildings that are still extant and which, for that matter, are much clearer evidence of Romanticism than the toys and medals and even than a lot of the paintings included in the show.

For if the mind is alternately both stupefied by the extent and teased by the absence of classification in the show, the same double frustration is produced by the paintings themselves. Can David and Courbet, to mention the two most flagrant outlanders, really be included in the Romantic Movement? On the one hand, David and his inflexible rules for painting constituted the Classicism against which the Romantic Movement revolted. On the other, Courbet was quite consciously in revolt against Romanticism as well as Classicism. Yet the show at the Tate had three big Davids and two Courbets. To be sure, the juxtapositions threw some light on both painters and perhaps some on the movement itself. Especially in the equestrian portrait of Stanislaw-Kostka and the scene of Napoleon crossing the Alps, David showed himself to contain some of the elements later to be developed as Romanticism.

But an exhibition of this kind is based on the acceptance of an art history convention. When you demonstrate, as is always easy, that the convention by no means corresponds in every detail to reality, you are beginning to say, in this instance, that after all there was no such thing as the Romantic Movement.

But the real complaint about the painting section is the apparent lack of any standard but that of the theme of the show—which, as we have just seen, could also be put aside when necessary. Resurrected and hung in number and acreage were platoons of French, English and German painters who enjoyed a brief popularity as representative of the Romantic Movement, have never been heard of since and should not be heard of now. The storms on mountains, the recollections of chivalry, the sentimental scenes from the New Testament were beyond number. True enough, all these things were part of the Romantic Movement, but the main function of the passing of time is the weeding out of the few things worthwhile in any age from the myriad cheap imitations they call into ephemeral existence. The dross dominated the show, as it always will if given half a chance. Within the exhibition the material needed was on hand, but it was obscured by its own parodies. Perhaps because of size, the print section was the strongest, affording a large selection of Goya, some fine Piranesi engravings and such rarities as the etchings of Cruikshank.

ELSEWHERE in London, the most satisfactory show of the summer was a large—in the usual, not the Tate, sense—exhibition of 19th and 20th-Century Europeans at the Marlborough gallery. The 30 artists represented by 80 pictures were all main stream and mostly French. Like the show at the Tate, the Marlborough exhibition started with Delacroix, a small picture of an Arab hunter. Included were excellent if not top examples by Cézanne, Boudin, Monet—a water lily picture—Van Gogh, Gauguin, Manet, Bonnard and on up through Picasso, Braque, Matisse and Rouault. The progress was logical, colorful and extremely attractive, proving more than New York galleries ever do that good works by the golden horde are still available if you've got the gold.

The most attractive work by a young Englishman I saw in London was at the Piccadilly Gallery, paintings by Jack Simcock. Now 30, he comes from the mining country around Stoke-on-Trent and paints as if he were still there, getting a heavy black texture for people and scenes of life lost in coal and iron.

FRANK GETLEIN

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

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